Category Archives: Valuation

How to Become a Successful Long-Term Investor – Part 3 of 3 – The Folly of Market Timing

28 Saturday Sep 2019

Posted by in Alan Greenspan, asset allocation, Average Returns, behavioral finance, bubbles, correlation, correlation coefficient, Dot Com Bubble, finance, finance theory, financial goals, financial markets, Financial Media, Financial News, financial planning, Greenspan, historical returns, Individual Investing, individual investors, Internet Bubble, investing, investing advice, investing information, investing tips, investment advice, investments, Irrational Exuberance, market timing, math, personal finance, portfolio, risk tolerance, risks of stocks, S&P 500, S&P 500 historical returns, S&P 500 Index, statistics, stock market, Stock Market Returns, Stock Market Valuation, stock prices, stocks, Valuation, volatility

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This article is the third and final post in my three-part series on learning how to be a successful long-term investor.  The general theme underlying all of the topics has been developing enough of an understanding of the stock market gyrations and sometimes wild ride to form reasonable expectations at the outset.  Those expectations lead directly into to developing a long-term investment strategy and plan that you are much more likely to stick with through “thick and thin” because you know what is coming.  Of course, you will not know the order in which the ups and downs may come, but you will have a ton of information helpful to be much less likely to lose your nerve or get overly excited.

The last topic will be about “market timing”.  We will delve deeply into the concept and see how very difficult it has been in the past, and, I believe, will continue to be for the foreseeable future.  Now the discussion to follow will be entirely self-contained; however, it might be helpful to take a look at the first two articles to have additional context.  The opening topic was an overview of the history of stock market returns using the S&P 500 Index (dividends reinvested).  Here is a link to that post:

https://latticeworkwealth.com/2019/09/23/successful-long-term-investing/

The second topic was a discussion about the concept of risk.  We explored how it is normally defined, ways that you can gauge your tolerance for risk given the information from the first post, and explored some methods/mindsets to reduce risk in your investment portfolio.  Here is a link to that post:

https://latticeworkwealth.com/2019/09/25/successful-long-term-investor-risk/

So now, we will turn to the topic for the last article.  As mentioned above, we are going to take a look at “market timing”.  In general, the idea of “market timing” is to develop ways to be able to buy stocks when they are very undervalued and also sell stocks right near the market peak to avoid a big downturn.  There are certain variations where an investor is not necessarily trying to time the most opportune time but trade along with the momentum of the stock market and anticipating the next movement prior to other stock market participants.

“Market timing” is notoriously difficult to do.  But you will see considerable time devoted every day to financial market television and periodicals advising individual investors what trades to make.  I would submit that following things and pundits on a daily basis adds to “noise” and “information overload”.  Additionally, for every guest that predicts a big leg up in the market, there will be another guest later in the day who tells you that we are in a bubble and stocks will drop dramatically soon.

Another lesser talked about item is the main guests that are invited to speak on television or are quoted in financial periodicals.  Typically, the guest introduction will be prefaced by this man/woman predicted the last major move in the stock market and we are so lucky to have him/her back again.  While these guests are great to hear from, there is a severe amount of “selection bias”.  What do I mean by “selection bias”?  You will rarely see a guest brought on to be lambasted for a prediction that never came to fruition or was just flat out wrong.  The vast majority of guests on television or market experts in financial articles will be the ones who made a very prescient call on the direction of the stock market.

The promise of “market timing” is still so enticing.  It normally relates to the fear of losing money or the greed of just not wanting to miss the next big bull market trend upward in the stock market.  However, the ability to call the market tops or bottoms has proven to be pretty much a 50/50 flip of the coin (now I am being generous at that).  One of the examples that I love to give is the coining of the term “irrational exuberance”.  The former chair of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, used that new term to state that the stock market was in what he thought was a bubble.  Little do people remember, but he first gave the speech in December 1996 to refer to what would become the Dot.Com bubble and bust.  Greenspan was proven right but the top of that bubble occurred in March 2000.  I use that example because irrational activity in the markets can persist for much, much longer than you might expect.

So, now I know that some people reading this post will be able to point to experts who made the great calls or even their own calls on the direction of the stock market.  Well, I will start off the discussion by showing that “market timing” is indeed somewhat possible.  But it takes much longer periods of time than you might think at first.  Here is how we will proceed in the analysis.  I discussed how the long-term historical average of the S&P 500 Index from 1957-2018 has been 9.8%.  It would seem logical then that, if stock market returns were below that average or above that average for a certain length of time, you could just do the opposite figuring that stock market returns would eventually trend back to that average (in the jargon reversion to the mean).

The problem is, as I briefly mentioned in the last paragraph, that the time period needs to be so long that it is almost untenable for individual investors to practically implement.  In fact, we have to use 15-year annualized returns to illustrate the theory.  So, if the stock market has been below/above trend, we will buy/sell because an inflection point has to come.  Let’s take a look at it graphically to drive the point home:

Fifteen Year Correlation

In the graph depicted above, we have exactly the returns we would like to see.  The blue dots are the past 15 years of stock market returns, and the orange dots are the next 15 years of stock market returns.  The dots are what we would term to have an inverse relationship.  In fact, for all of you somewhat familiar with statistics, the correlation coefficient is -0.857.  Therefore, there is a really strong relationship here that leads us to the promise of “market timing”.  Should we give up on it so early?

The problem with “market timing” is that, for any length of time less than 15 years of annualized stock returns, there really is no relationship (at least no actionable trading of stocks for your investment portfolio).  Let’s take a look at the same concept in the first graph with a look at one-year and three-year current and then future returns:

One Year Correlation

Three Year Correlation

Using the one-year and three-year current and then future stock market returns of the S&P 500 Index, our dots just kind of do not follow a discernable pattern.  Again, for the statistically inclined folks out there, the correlation coefficients are -0.10 and -0.041, respectively.  As always, we won’t get too waded down into the mathematical weeds but a correlation coefficient close to 0 means that there is essentially no correlation/relationship between the two.  To make an analogy, you can think of what is the correlation between birds in your backyard and the number of jars of pickles for sale at your local grocery store?  Well, there should be no relationship whatsoever.  Even if there were, it would not make any sense.  In our case here, there is at least some logic underlying our premise of the most recent return on the S&P 500 Index and the future returns over that same time period.  As we see though, there is really nothing actionable to embark upon for individual investors to properly engage in “market timing”.

Before we totally give up on “market timing”, we can take a look at the same charts but extending the time periods to five years and ten years.  Let’s take a look at those two graphs:

Five Year Correlation

Ten Year Correlation

The correlation coefficient for the five-year chart is 0.028, so we cannot really use that long of a time period either.  I will admit that the ten-year chart looks a little more promising.  We have a graph that looks somewhat more like the fifteen-year graph that I started off with.  In fact, the correlation coefficient is -0.276.  And a negative number is what we want to see in order to try “market timing”.  Unfortunately, the number is really not strong enough to not get caught.  By this I mean, we can see that “market timing” would have worked from 1975-1985 and also from 1990-2001 roughly.  However, 1965-1975 has a grouping of returns that don’t work and 2002-2008 has mixed results as well.  Note that there are less data points because there needs to be at least 10 years of future returns in order to compare the current record of 10-year annualized returns with what the next 10 years of stock returns will end up being.

Overall, we have seen that “market timing” in the short term (even as defined out to five years) does not really have much, if any, predictive power.  Therefore, if you make decisions related to “market timing” based upon how the stock market has performed in any time period five years or less, it is clearly a “fool’s errand” or incredibly difficult to do.  And by the latter, I mean that you can reliably do so over more than one major change in market direction.  The majority of market pundits that you will see or read about have made one correct call which is not nearly enough to judge his/her investing acumen related to “market timing”.

I will close out the discussion of “market timing” by using the Financial Crisis and ensuing Great Recession.  Many folks correctly called (or were proven right without the reason for the bubble matching their investment thesis) this major stock market inflection point.  They correctly saw the unsustainable bubble in housing, the rise of financial stocks, and the buildup of toxic securities like subprime loans.  However, many of those same individuals never changed their investment thesis and failed to tell individual investors to return to the stock market and buy.  Essentially there are still folks that will tell you we are in a bubble.  Now I am not bold and/or grandiose enough to weigh in on the current value of the stock market.  But you need to know that most of the people who call a wicked crash in stocks or a massive bull market do not change their investment thesis prior to the next big turn.

For example, let’s say that you learned about stock investing 10 years or so ago and decided to invest $1,000.00 in the S&P 500 Index toward the end of October 2007.  And yes, this was the absolute worst time to invest in stocks.  Sadly, by March 2009, you would have lost 50% of your investment and have only $500.00 at that point in time.  You might feel great if you listened to someone who called the top and told you that the fourth quarter of 2007 was the absolute worse time to buy stocks.  But I am willing to bet that this same person would not have told you when it was “safe” to invest again.  If you knew to expect bouts of extreme volatility in the stock market beforehand, you could have kept your money in the stock market.  At the end of December 2018, you would have had $1,712.36 using our 13.1% 10-year annualized return over that time.  If the original market predictor of catastrophe told you to just keep your $1,000.00 in the bank you would have $1,160.54 (assuming generously that you could earn 1.50% over the ten years in your bank saving account).  Adjusting the hypothetical investor who simply kept his/her money in stocks back to inflation, he/she would have $1,404.73 (assuming 2.0% inflation over the last 10 years which is higher than was actually experienced).  At the end of December 2018, you would have a bit more than 21% higher in inflation-adjusted dollars than the person who just never invested (or took his/her money out of stocks right at the end of October 2007 but never returned to stocks).

Now I will admit that my hypothetical scenario would have tried the “intestinal fortitude” of the most seasoned professional investors after seeing a 50% market drop over 1.5 years.  My only point with the example is that, even if you could not have held your nerve to remain invested in stocks over the Financial Crisis, the investment pundit(s) who tells you the exact top with a brilliant prediction also needs to tell you when to invest or sell again in the future (i.e. “market timing”).  Rarely will you see such a prognosticator that can totally change their investment thesis to get the next call right.  You are much better off abstaining from “market timing” and sticking to your long-term investment strategy.  Of course, that may indeed call for selling or buying a portion of stocks at certain given points to change your investment portfolio allocation to match your risk tolerance and financial goals.  But trying to utilize “market timing” to be in and out to experience hardly any losses and capture all the gains is just not realistic, so you might as well discard the entire investment strategy of “market timing”.

Before You Take Any Investment Advice, Consider the Source – Version 2.0

18 Wednesday Sep 2019

Posted by in asset allocation, Average Returns, behavioral finance, bonds, Charlie Munger, confirmation bias, Consumer Finance, emerging markets, Fama, finance, financial advice, Financial Advisor, financial goals, financial markets, Financial Media, Financial News, financial planning, financial services industry, Geometric Returns, Individual Investing, individual investors, interest rates, Internet Bubble, investing, investing advice, investing, investments, stocks, bonds, asset allocation, portfolio, investment advice, investments, Markowitz, Modern Portfolio Theory, MPT, personal finance, portfolio, risk, risk tolerance, stock market, Stock Market Returns, Stock Market Valuation, stock prices, stocks, Uncategorized, Valuation, volatility, Warren Buffett

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I originally wrote about this topic five years ago.  However, I think that it may even be more relevant today.  You may have heard about behavioral finance/economics and how cognitive biases plagued individual investors when making financial and investing decisions especially during volatility times in the financial markets.  Sometimes an overlooked topic is the fact that whomever provides you with financial advice will invariably be affected by those same biases.  Yes, even the professionals cannot escape them.  One of the most prevalent and insidious cognitive biases is called “anchoring”.  In layman’s terms, “anchoring” describes the tendency of people to form a particular belief and then stick with it unless there is an incredible amount of evidence to the contrary.  It is just part of human nature; we generally do not want to admit that we were mistaken or flat out wrong.

Now when I am talking about considering the source, I am not referring to the person’s qualifications such as having a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), Certified Financial Planner (CFP), or Chartered Market Technician (CMT) designation.  I am referring to the person’s investing paradigm.  For the most part, financial professionals are influenced greatly by the time period in which they first start out in the financial services industry.  The first several of years have an outsized impact on their investing recommendations throughout the rest of their careers.  I will give you an example in life, and then I will talk about Warren Buffett and even myself.  Take special note that I am including myself in this “anchoring” cognitive bias within the context of investing.

There have been many studies that show that the kind of music you listen to most during your teen years becomes your preferred type of music.  For example, there are many people in their early 40’s that love 80’s rock.  They would prefer to listen to that over any type of new music.  My parents are in their seventies now, and they love to listen to Peter, Paul, & Mary, the Beach Boys, Neil Diamond, Motown, and lots of one-hit wonders from the 50’s and 60’s.  Think about your own taste in music.  Does this ring a bell?  Most people fall into this category, and it is almost subconscious.  You like a certain genre of music best, and it sticks with you.  Did you have a family member that was really into music and had a collection of records?  Sometimes you get introduced to music at an even younger age, and you are drawn to it.  You listened to it during your formative years.  The same goes for investing in a rather similar way.

If we take a look at Warren Buffett, he was definitely influenced by the time period in which he started learning about investing seriously.  Buffett read Security Analysis by Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, and he knew right away that he wanted to go to Columbia to get his MS in Economics.  The themes in the book seemed to resonate with him.  I have heard stories that the value investing class with Ben Graham and Warren Buffett was really a conversation between the two of them.  The rest of the classmates just sat back and enjoyed the “show”.  Warren Buffett also learned a lot from a lesser known gentleman, Phil Fisher.  Phil Fisher wrote the classic treatise on “scuttlebutt” called Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits.  “Scuttlebutt” is essentially trying to gain every last piece of information you can about a company prior to investing.  This technique includes, not only speaking to management and reading annual reports, but talking to competitors, suppliers, current employees, past employees, and several other sources.  Warren Buffett remarked in the past that he was “15% Fisher and 85% Graham” in terms of his investing style.  Most experts on the career of Buffett would say that the percentage has shifted toward Fisher quite a bit, especially with the massive size of Berkshire Hathaway now.

I did not pick Warren Buffett because of his long-term track record of stellar performance.  I only picked him because many individuals are familiar with Warren Buffett.  Warren started out working for Graham in the early 50’s after he graduated from Columbia in 1951.  If you look back at this time in history, the stock market had finally gained back its losses from the great crash of October 1929.  The baby boom was in full swing, and the US economy was on overdrive in terms of growth.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was set up back in 1933 after the crash once an investigation was done regarding the causes of this debacle.  There were two important promulgations from the SEC in 1934 and 1940 that were issued in order to ensure that company information was available to the public and not fraudulent.  Well, there were still scams, but they were harder to pull off.  (As an aside, the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 did not stop Bernie Madoff from stealing billions of dollars several years ago).  Buffett and Graham (and Graham’s partner, Newman) loved to get their hands on any piece of information they could.  In fact, Buffett used to read entire books on every single public company.  During that time period, information was so disjointed and hard to get.  However, it was now available to the public and professional investors who could do much more thorough analyses.  The financial markets had far more inefficiencies back then.  This time period was before the dawn of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMT).  Thus, there was a great deal of opportunities for individuals like Buffett who soaked up all the information he could find.

Buffett started his own investment partnership in the mid 50’s.  It was essentially a hedge fund in most respects.  Without getting into too much of the details, Buffett was able to earn 20% more on average than the Down Jones Average annually until 1969.  The stock market at this time seemed to be overpriced in his estimation, so Buffett disbanded the partnership.  He referred his partners to Bill Ruane of the famed Sequoia Fund.  Bill was a former classmate of Warren, and he amassed quite a record himself.

So if we look at Buffett’s beginning career, he saw how doing your homework really paid off.  In fact, there are even stories that Ben Graham would use examples in his lectures about companies he was going to buy.  After class let out, all the students rushed to call, or see directly, their stock brokers to buy the companies Graham presented on.  Buffett learned from Graham the importance of valuing a company based upon verifiable evidence and not market sentiment.  Fisher’s lessons showed him the benefit of accumulating information from different sources in order to truly understand a business prior to investing.  These formative years are still with Buffett.  Now Charlie Munger, Buffett’s Vice Chairman at Berkshire Hathaway, has been an influence as well.  What is little known is that they grew up together in Omaha, Nebraska, and they were able to meet during this same time period.  This introduction to investing left an indelible mark on Warren Buffett that permeates his investing career today.

Obviously I am no Warren Buffett, but I started investing in mutual funds at age 13 in November 1987.  What got me so interested in the stock market?  Obviously Black Monday on October 19, 1987 really caught my attention.  It was not really the crash that really piqued my interest though.  My father told me that the market drop of 508 points on that day was an overreaction (down over 20% amazed me).  I did not know much about stocks, but it seemed to me like the world was ending.  At least that was how the nightly news portrayed things.  My father said watch the market over the next several days.  To my absolute amazement, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) went up almost 290 points in the next two trading sessions.  Wow!  This turn of events was really weird to me.  How could stocks move around in value so greatly?  I thought that all the big money investors in the stock market really knew what they were doing.  However, most everyone was caught by surprise by Black Monday.  The other interesting thing for me was that 1987 turned out to be a positive year for the DJIA.  If you want to get your friends’ attention, you can ask them what the return of the DJIA was for 1987 and 1988 (negative return).  Most people will get it wrong.

Well, these events left a mark on me.  When I learned more about investing and was exposed to Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMT), I really did not think it was true given my start in investing back in the latter portion of 1987.  How could the value of the entire U.S. economy be worth 20% less after one day of trading?  Now, the stock market is normally efficient and stock prices are correct, but I knew that there were inflection points in the stock market where rationality was thrown out the door.  Therefore, when I learned about Mr. Market and the vicissitudes and vagaries of the stock market from Ben Graham’s books, I liked that metaphor and way to characterize volatility in the stock market.  For better or worse, I really do not care for the academic, ivory tower analysis of behavior in the stock market.  I cling more to focus investing, value investing, and seeing the financial markets as complex adaptive systems.  I would fall into the camp of Warren Buffett and the great hedge fund investor, George Soros.  Both men have said that they would never be able to pass the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) exam.  The CFA is now the standard designation for all portfolio managers of stocks and bonds.  I tried studying for it, but a lot of it made little sense to me.  I guess that is why I think it is funny when Buffett says he wants to gift money to universities to install permanent chairs in business schools to teach Modern Portfolio Theory forever.

Most of the financial professionals you meet will range in age from twenties to sixties.  You should always ask them when they started investing or their career as a Financial Advisor.  Here are the ten major events that will cover those individuals:

  • The 1973-1974 severe bear market;
  • The Death of Equities article from Business Week magazine in 1979;
  • Black Monday in October 1987;
  • The Bond Bubble Bursting in 1994;
  • The Asian Contagion and Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) incidents in 1997-1998;
  • The Barron’s article in December 1999 that questioned the relevance of the Oracle of Omaha, Warren Buffett;
  • The Bursting of the Internet Bubble in April 2001;
  • The Financial Crisis and ensuing Great Recession of 2008-2009;
  • The “Lost Decade” of Returns from the S&P 500 from 2001-2010 when stocks averaged approximately 2% annually.
  • Managing Money is Easy. Look at my investing record over the past 10 years (2009-2018).  Note that the annualized return of the S&P 500 index over that period was 13.13%.

These major inflection points in the financial markets will have a great effect on your financial professional’s recommendations for investment portfolio allocation.  In fact, I met a Financial Advisor that tells his clients that they can expect to earn 12% annually from stocks over the long term.  He uses this return for modeling how much clients need to invest for retirement.  He was introduced to investing around 1996 which is when the stock market went gangbusters.  I know another Financial Advisor that tells his clients to never put more than 50% of their money in common stocks.  He tells this to all of his clients, even if they are in their thirties and have 30+ years until retirement.  He started advising clients in 2007, and he lost a great many clients in 2008.  Therefore, he wants to have limited downside risk for two reasons.  First, he has seen how much the stock market can drop in one year.  Second, this gentleman wants to ensure that his clients to not close accounts and flee to other financial professionals because the stocks in their portfolio go down 30-40% in a single year.

The importance today of the long, extended bull market of the past 10 years is extremely important to take into account for all individual investors.  A recent stretch of 13.13% annualized stock returns makes it seem that investing systematically over the long term is the correct investment strategy.  I would not disagree with that thought.  However, Financial Advisors with 10 years of experience or less will only tell clients what they would do hypothetically in the event of a major market decline in the stock and bond markets.  Hypotheticals and backtesting are all well and good.  But it has been my experience, that there is no substitute for actually investing during periods of extreme volatility and major stock market declines (20% or more).  For example, what was the best stock investment strategy right after the Internet Bubble implosion in terms of the asset class?  The best performing asset class for the next decade was to have a larger than normal allocation to emerging market stocks (think Ticker Symbol EEM or VWO).  Do you think that your Financial Advisor would have the stomach to recommend this investment to you after seeing the NASDAQ index fall by over 50%?

As you can see, the start of anyone’s investing career has an impact on their outlook for the financial markets and how to set up a portfolio properly.  I am not saying that any of this advice is “wrong” per se.  My only point is that you need to probe your Financial Advisor a little bit to understand the framework he/she is working with.  Thus, you can refer to the aforementioned list of ten major events in the history of the financial markets.  These events really shape the investment paradigm of all of us.  And, of course, I will admit that I am no different.

With that being said, most investment strategies recommended by Financial Advisors are borne out of those individuals first few years with the financial markets.  Some financial professionals are more bullish than others.  Others focus on downside risk and limiting volatility in investment portfolios.  Still others utilize complicated mathematics to build investment portfolios that are optimized.  Therefore, you need to understand your risk tolerance and financial goals very well.  You have your own personal experience with the market.  If your Financial Advisor is somewhat myopic and focused on the past repeating itself in the same way over and over, you need to be careful.  History does repeat itself, but the repeating events will be caused by much different factors in most cases.  Unfortunately, the financial markets and market participants are always adapting to changing investment strategies, global economic GDP growth, interest rates, geopolitical events, stock price volatility, and a whole host of other things.  You can learn from the past, but I urge you not to be “stuck” in the past with your Financial Advisor’s “anchoring” cognitive bias at the expense of setting up an investment portfolio that will allow you to reach your financial goals and match your risk tolerance.

Four Important Lessons for Individual Investors from the Brexit Vote

10 Sunday Jul 2016

Posted by in Alan Greenspan, Black Swan, bond market, Brexit, Brexit Vote, Emotional Intelligence, EQ, EU, European Union, Fed, Federal Reserve, finance, finance theory, financial advice, Financial Advisor, financial goals, financial markets, Financial Media, Financial News, financial planning, financial services industry, Greenspan, Individual Investing, individual investors, Internet Bubble, investing, investing advice, investing information, investing tips, investment advice, investments, Irrational Exuberance, Nassim Taleb, personal finance, portfolio, Post Brexit, PostBrexit, rebalancing, rebalancing investment portfolio, risk, risk tolerance, stock market, Stock Market Returns, Stock Market Valuation, Taleb, Uncategorized, Valuation, volatility, Warren Buffett

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The vote by the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) caught the majority of individual investors by surprise.  In fact, the so-called Brexit was not foreseen by many of the most sophisticated professional investors and money managers all around the world.  The election results sent shockwaves through the financial markets on the Friday and Monday following the Brexit vote.  The most notable effect was the devaluation of the pound to its lowest level since 1985.  Over the course of Tuesday through Friday, the US and European stock markets gained back nearly all their losses from the two days after the Brexit vote.  This fast-moving volatility has left individual investors feeling confused, frustrated, bewildered, and a bit scared.  However, the Brexit vote results offer individual investors a unique set of key lessons to learn and understand.

The four important lessons for individual investors from the Brexit vote are as follows:

  • 1)  There are very few seminal events in financial market history that affect the future path of stocks, bonds, and other assets.

 

The difficult thing to realize about the financial markets is that there are very few consequential events that make an inflection point or major change in the direction of the financial markets.  Even more frustrating than that, these consequential events are only known with the benefit of hindsight.  In other words, what seems like a monumental event today may or may not be considered one of those major events.  Given the fact that there are so few, there is a high probability that the seemingly major events of today will not fall into the seminal event category of financial market history.

What are some of the seminal events in financial market history?  Here is a list of some of the seminal events in chronological order:  the stock market crash in October 1987, the bursting of the bond bubble in 1994, the Asian contagion of 1997-1998, the bursting of the Internet bubble in March 2000, and the Great Recession of the financial crisis starting in September 2008.  There are many more examples previous to 1987, but these are events from recent financial market history that many individual investors will remember.  Keep in mind that in between all of these events are a string of other major events that turned out to be minor blips that caused only fleeting financial market volatility or none at all.

Furthermore, these seminal events are confusing to financial market participants in and of themselves.  For example, let’s take a closer look at the stock market crash of October 1987.  The US stock market dropped over 20% in one day, and things looked very dire.  If an individual investor with a portfolio of $100,000 had sold his/her stock mutual funds (primary investment vehicle used by individuals on the day of the crash, he/she would have a portfolio worth $80,000 approximately.  That type of individual investor was likely to be very fearful and stay out the of stock market for the remainder of 1987.  If an individual investor with a similar portfolio of $100,000 had keep his/her money in stocks on the day of the crash and for the rest of 1987, he/she would actually have roughly $102,000 at the end of 1987.  Why?  Well, there are not too many investors these days that remember how 1987 really turned out for the US stock market.  The S&P 500 index ended up about 2% for the year, so US stocks recovered all of the losses from the crash and a bit more.  Here’s a little fun exercise:  Ask your Financial Advisor or Financial Planner what the return of stocks was in 1987.  The vast majority will assume it was a horrible down year for performance returns.

Another excellent example is the bursting of the Internet bubble in March 2000.  The reason it is so interesting is that individual (and even professional) investors forget the history.  Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve during that time period, gave a famous speech where he coined the term, “irrational exuberance”.  Greenspan warned investors that the Internet and technology stocks were getting to valuations that were way out of line with historical norms for valuation of stocks.  What do individual investors forget?  Well, that famous speech was actually given in December 1996.  Yes, that is correct.  Greenspan warned of the Internet bubble, but it took nearly 3 ½ years before financial markets took a nosedive.  The main point here is that smart, rationale professional money managers and economists can know that financial market valuations are out of whack in terms of valuation at any given point in time.  (Note that this can also be stock market valuations that are too low).  However, these conditions can persist for far longer than anyone can imagine.  That is why individual investors should not be so quick to sell (or buy) major portions of their portfolio of stocks and bonds when these predictions or observations are make.

For a more in depth look at this concept, you can refer to a blog post I wrote three years ago on this very subject.  The link to that blog post is as follows:

https://latticeworkwealth.com/2013/08/04/todays-news-should-prompt-you-to-adjust-your-entire-investment-portfolio/

  • 2)  Investors focus on valuations (no emotions) while traders and speculators focus on market sentiment (emotions) and valuation (no emotions).

The majority of professionals who talk to individual investors and provide advice will explain how important it is to keep emotions out of the equation when dealing with elevated market volatility.  When the financial markets are bouncing up and down by large amounts in the short term, it can be very difficult to keep a cool head and resist the urge to buy or sell stocks, bonds, or other assets.  The frenetic pace of market movements makes it seems as though an individual investor needs to do something, anything in response.  The standard advice is to keep one’s emotions in check focus on the long term, and stick to the financial plan.  What is usually missing from that advice is a more complete explanation why.

There are two general types of financial market participants:  investors and traders/speculators.  These two groups have vastly different goals and approaches to the financial markets.  Investors are focused on investing in stocks, bonds, and other assets in order to obtain returns over time from their investments.  The long term might be defined as five years.  Thus, day-to-day fluctuations in the financial markets mean very little to them.  On the flipside, traders/speculators are focused on making gains in stocks, bonds, and other assets in the short term in order to obtain returns.  The short term for this group might be hourly, the medium term might be daily, and the long term might be weekly.  With this particular group, they need to determine both the likely direction of the financial markets due to both market sentiment and valuation.

As you might imagine, the traders/speculators have to analyze emotions or the psychology of financial market participants.  Gauging market sentiment (general short term positioning of traders/speculators in stocks, bonds, and other assets in terms of their trend to buy or sell) is all about emotions.  Additionally, they must be able to combine that with proper valuations for stocks, bonds, and other assets.  Essentially they need to be correct twice.  On the other hand, investors are focused on the long term which corresponds to valuation.  Valuation over the long term is not driven by emotions.  There is a very famous saying by Ben Graham who taught one of the most well-known investors of all time, Warren Buffett.  Graham said, “In the short term the market is a voting machine, in the long term the market is a weighing machine.”  The takeaway from Graham’s quotation is that market sentiment (i.e. emotions) can drive the financial markets wildly over the short term.  However, after a period of years, financial markets always seem to follow the path back to what their true valuations are.  Since emotions are not part of that equation, individual investors should feel more comfortable ignoring or at least subduing their emotions whenever the financial markets exhibit high levels of volatility.

A related part of the story is the financial media (both TV and print) almost always provide information for traders/speculators.  To be perfectly honest, the financial media would not have much to talk about if long-term investing was the topic.  Essentially they would recommend analyzing one’s risk tolerance, define one’s financial goals, and then build a portfolio of financial assets to reach those goals over the long term.  Yes, true investing is very boring actually.  The financial media needs to have something more “exciting” to talk about in order to have viewers (readers) and the corresponding advertising dollars that come from that.  Therefore, the stories and article appearing in the financial media are geared toward traders/speculators.  Now if you are an investor, you can either ignore this bombardment of information or take it with the proverbial “grain of salt”.  Thus, you can keep your emotions in check when all the traders/speculators are wondering how to react to the market volatility right now each and every trading day or week.

For a more in depth discussion of managing one’s emotions as it relates to investors, you can refer to one of my older blog posts.  The link to that blog post is as follows:

https://latticeworkwealth.com/2015/06/11/two-steps-to-help-individual-investors-become-more-successful-at-investing/

  • 3)  The benefit of diversification can disappear or be reduced greatly whenever there are periods are elevated volatility.

The benefit of diversification is one of the hallmarks of the proper construction of an investment portfolio for individual investors.  The basic premise (which has been proven over very long periods of time) is that investing in different asset classes (e.g. stocks, bonds, real estate, precious metals, etc.) reduces the volatility in the value of an investment portfolio.  A closer look at diversification is necessary before relating the discussion back to the Brexit vote.  The benefit of diversification stems from correlations between asset classes.  What is correlation?  To keep things simple, a correlation of 1 means that two different assets are perfectly correlated.  So a correlation of 1 means that when one asset goes up, the other asset goes up too.  A correlation of -1 means that two assets are negatively correlated.  So a correlation of -1 means that when one asset goes up, the other asset goes down (exactly the opposite).  A correlation of 0 means that the two assets are not correlated at all.  So a correlation of 0 means that when one asset goes up, the other asset might go up, go down, or stay the same.  Having an investment portfolio that is properly diversified means that the investments in that portfolio have a combination of assets that have an array of correlations which dampens volatility.  Essentially the positively correlated assets can be balanced out by the negatively correlated assets over time which reduces the volatility of the balance in one’s brokerage statement or 401(k) plan.

What does all this correlation stuff have to do with the Brexit vote?  Surprisingly, it has quite a bit to do with the Brexit vote.  Note that this discussion also applies to any situation/event that causes the financial markets to exhibit high levels of volatility.  During extreme volatility like investors witnessed after the Brexit vote, the correlations of most asset classes started to increase to 1.  Unfortunately for individual investors, that meant that diversification broke down in the short term.  Most all domestic and international stock markets went down dramatically over the course of the two trading days following the Brexit vote.  Therefore, individuals who had their stock investments allocated to various different domestic and international stocks or value and growth stocks all lost money.  When correlations converge upon 1 during extreme market shocks, there is really nowhere to “hide” over the short term.  In fact, the only two asset classes that did very well during this period were gold and government bonds.

What is the key takeaway for individual investors?  Individual investors need to realize that there is an enormous benefit to having a diversified portfolio.  However, diversification is associated with investing over the long term and thereby harnessing its benefit.  There are times of market stress, like the Brexit vote and aftermath, where diversification will not be present or helpful.  When those times come around, individual investors need to keep emotions out of the picture and stick to their long-term financial plans and investment portfolios.

  • 4)  The surprise Brexit vote provides the perfect opportunity for individual investors to evaluate their risk tolerances for exposure to various risky assets.

The two trading days after the surprise vote by the UK to leave the EU (Brexit) were very volatile and very tough to keep emotionally calm.  Individual investors were faced with a very unusual situation, and the urge to sell many, if not all of their investments was very real.  That reaction is perfectly understandable.  Now for the bad news, there will be another time when volatility is as great as or larger than the volatility that the Brexit vote just caused.  In fact, there will be many such periods over the coming years and decades for individual investors.  In spite of that bad news, the Brexit vote should be looked at as a learning experience and opportunity.  Since individual investors know that there will be another period of elevated volatility, they can revisit their personal risk tolerances.

It is extremely difficult to try to determine or capture one’s risk tolerance for downturns in the financial markets in the abstract or through hypothetical situations.  You or with the assistance of your financial professional normally asks the question of whether or not you would likely sell all of your stocks if the market went down 10%, 15%, 20%, or more.  How does an individual investor answer that question?  What is the right answer?  There is no right or wrong answer to that type of question.  Each individual investor is unique and has his/her own risk tolerance for fluctuations in his/her investment portfolio.  A better way to answer the question is to convert those percentages to actual dollar amounts.  For example, if an individual investor starts with $100,000, would he/she be okay with the investment portfolio decreasing to $90,000, $85,000, or $80,000 over the short term.  Note that the aforementioned dollar amounts sync up with the 10%, 15%, and 20% declines illustrated previously.

The opportunity from the Brexit vote is that individual investors have concrete examples of the volatility experienced in their investment portfolios.  It is far easier to analyze and determine one’s risk tolerance by looking at actual periods of market stress.  Depending on your stock investments, the total two-day losses might have been anywhere between 5% to 10%.  Let’s use a 10% decline for purposes of relating this actual volatility to one’s risk tolerance.  If an individual investor was invested 100% in stocks prior to the Brexit vote, he/she would have lost 10% in this scenario.  Let’s use hypothetical dollar amounts:  if the starting investment portfolio was $100,000, the ending investment portfolio was $90,000.  Now the vast majority of individuals do not have all of their money invested in stocks.  So let’s modify the example above to an individual investor who has 50% in stocks and 50% in cash.  In that particular scenario, the individual investor has $50,000 invested in stocks and $50,000 invested in cash.  If stocks go down by 10%, this individual investor will have an ending investment portfolio of $95,000.  Why?  The individual investor only losses 10% on $50,000 which is $5,000 not the full $10,000 loss experienced by the individual investor with a hypothetical portfolio of 100% in stocks.

The importance of the illustrations above and its relation to the Brexit vote is that one can quickly calculate the actual losses from a market decline with a good degree of accuracy.  So let’s say that you had 60% of your money invested in stocks prior to the Brexit vote.  If the overall stock market declines by 10%, your stock investments will only decline by 6% (60% * 10%) assuming the other 40% of your investment portfolio remained unchanged.  So let’s put this all together now.  If you look back at the stock market volatility caused by the Brexit vote, you need to adjust the overall stock market decline by the percentage amount you have invested in stocks.  That adjusted percentage loss will be close to the decline in your overall investment portfolio.  Now whatever that adjusted percentage amount is, ask yourself if you are comfortable with that percentage loss over the short term.  Or is that way too risky?  If the adjusted percentage is way too risky for you and makes you uncomfortable, that is perfectly fine.  The important piece of knowledge to learn is that you need to work with your financial professional or reexamine your investment portfolio yourself to reduce your exposure to stocks such that the adjusted percentage loss is reasonable for you to withstand.  Why?  Because there will be another market volatility event on the order of magnitude of the Brexit aftermath or even worse.

Keep in mind that I am not making a financial market prediction over the short term.  The important point is that the history of financial markets has shown that periods of elevated market volatility (i.e. lots of fluctuations up and down) keep occurring over time.  The Brexit vote provides a real-life example to determine if your risk tolerance is actually lower than you first imagined.  The next cause of market volatility may be a known market event similar to how the UK vote to leave the EU was.  The harder things to deal with are market volatility stemming from the unknown and unforeseeable.  These market volatility events are called “black swans” which is the term coined by Nassim Taleb in his book by the same name several years back.  A “black swan” can be a positive event for the market or a negative event for the market.  As it relates to individual investors and risk tolerance, the negative “black swan” is applicable.  Now the term “black swan” is improperly used today by many investment professionals.  A “black swan” is an event that by definition is unknown and cannot be predicted.  When it does occur though, there is a period of extreme market volatility afterward.  Thus, you can adjust your risk tolerance to be better prepared for future events that will cause market volatility, either known events like the Brexit vote or unforeseen events.  The Brexit vote aftermath should be embraced by individual investors as a golden opportunity to ensure that they are properly (or more precisely) measuring their risk tolerances.

Summary of Important Lessons for Individual Investor from the Brexit Vote:

  1.  There are very few monumental financial market events that should cause individual investors to feel inclined to immediately change their investment portfolios. Plus, they can only truly be identified by hindsight;
  2. Investors should focus on valuation of financial assets (no emotions here), traders/speculators worry about market sentiment (emotions) and valuation (no emotions here);
  3. The benefit of diversification can disappear or be greatly reduced during periods of extreme market volatility and financial market stress over the short term;
  4. The surprise Brexit vote offers individual investors a valuable opportunity to see if their risk tolerances are aligned with the possibilities of short-term market declines.  This real-life event can be used to redefine one’s risk tolerance to better withstand similar periods of market volatility that will inevitably occur in the future.

Are Stocks Currently Overvalued, Undervalued, or Fairly Valued? Answer: Yes.

10 Tuesday May 2016

Posted by in academia, academics, asset allocation, Average Returns, business, CAPE, CAPE P/E Ratio, Consumer Finance, Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio, Education, finance, finance theory, financial advice, financial goals, financial markets, Financial Media, Financial News, financial planning, financial services industry, Forward P/E Ratio, Individual Investing, individual investors, interest rates, investing, investing advice, investing information, investing tips, investment advice, investments, Nobel Prize, Nobel Prize in Economics, P/E Ratio, passive investing, personal finance, portfolio, risk, Robert Shiller, Schiller, Shiller P/E Ratio, statistics, stock market, Stock Market Returns, Stock Market Valuation, stock prices, stocks, Valuation, volatility

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Confusing and frustrating as it may be, the answer about the current valuation of stocks will always be different depending on who you ask. Various economists, mutual fund portfolio managers, research analysts, financial news print and TV personalities, and other parties seem to disagree on this very important question.  Financial professionals will offer a wide range of financial and economic statistics in support of these opinions on the current valuation of stocks.  One of the most often cited statistics in support of a person’s opinion is the P/E ratio of the stock market at any given point in time.   Many financial professionals use it as one of the easiest numbers to be able to formulate a viewpoint on stock valuation.  However, when it comes to any statistic, one must always be skeptical in terms of both the way the number is calculated and its predictive value.  Any time one number is used to describe the financial markets one must always be leery.  A closer examination of the P/E ratio is necessary to show why its usage alone is a poor way to make a judgement in regard to the proper valuation of stocks.

The P/E ratio is short for Price/Earnings ratio. The value is calculated by taking the current stock price divided by the annual earnings of the company.  When it is applied to an entire stock market index like the S&P 500 index, the value is calculated by taking the current value of the index divided by the sum of the annual earnings of the 500 companies included in the index.  One of the very important things to be aware of is that the denominator of the equation may actually be different depending on who is using the P/E ratio.  Some people will refer to the P/E ratio in terms of the last reported annual earnings for the company (index).  Other people will refer to the P/E ratio in terms of the expected earnings for the company (index) over the next year.  In this particular case, the P/E ratio is referred to as the Forward P/E ratio.  Both ratios have a purpose.  The traditional P/E ratio measures the reported accounting earnings of the firm (index).  It is a known value.  The Forward P/E ratio measures the profits that the firm (index) will create in the future.  However, the future profits are only a forecast.  Many analysts prefer to use the Forward P/E ratio because the value of any firm (or index of companies) is determined by its future ability to generate profits for its owners.  The historical earnings are of lesser significance.

The P/E ratio is essentially a measure of how much investors value $1 worth of earnings and what they are willing to pay for it. For example, a firm might have a P/E ratio of 10, 20, 45, or even 100.  In the case of a firm that is losing money, the P/E ratio does not apply.  In general, investors are willing to pay more per each $1 in earnings if the company has the potential to grow a great deal in the future.  Examples of this would be companies like Amazon (Ticker Symbol:  AMZN) or Netflix (Ticker Symbol:  NFLX) that have P/E ratios well over 100.  Some companies are further along in their life cycle and offer less growth opportunities and tend to have lower P/E ratios.  Examples of this would be General Motors or IBM that have P/E ratios in the single digits or low teens, respectively.  Investors tend to pay more for companies that offer the promise of future growth than for companies that are in mature or declining industries.

When it comes to the entire stock market, the P/E ratio applied to a stock market index (such as the S&P 500 index) measures how much investors are willing to pay for the earnings of all the companies in that particular index. For purposes of discussion and illustration, I will refer to the S&P 500 index while discussing the P/E ratio.  The average P/E ratio for the S&P 500 index over the last 40 years (1966-2015) was 18.77.  When delivering an opinion on the valuation of the S&P 500 index, many financial professionals will cite this number and state that stocks are overvalued (undervalued) if the current P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index is above (below) that historical average.  If the current P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index is roughly in line with that historical average, the term fairly valued will usually be used in relation to stocks.  The rationale is that stocks are only worth what their earnings/profits are over time.  There is evidence that the stock market can become far too highly priced (as in March 2000 or December 2007) or far too lowly priced (as in 1982) based upon the P/E ratio observed at that time.  Unfortunately, the relative correlation between looking at the difference between the current P/E ratio of the stock market and the historical P/E ratio does not work perfectly.  In fact, it is only under very extreme circumstances and with perfect hindsight that investors can see that stocks were overvalued or undervalued in relation to the P/E ratio at that time.

Here are the historical P/E ratios for the S&P 500 index from 1966-2015 as measured by the P/E ratio at the end of the year. Additionally, the annual return of the S&P index for that year is also shown.

Year P/E Ratio Annual Return
2015 22.17 1.30%
2014 20.02 13.81%
2013 18.15 32.43%
2012 17.03 15.88%
2011 14.87 2.07%
2010 16.30 14.87%
2009 20.70 27.11%
2008 70.91 -37.22%
2007 21.46 5.46%
2006 17.36 15.74%
2005 18.07 4.79%
2004 19.99 10.82%
2003 22.73 28.72%
2002 31.43 -22.27%
2001 46.17 -11.98%
2000 27.55 -9.11%
1999 29.04 21.11%
1998 32.92 28.73%
1997 24.29 33.67%
1996 19.53 23.06%
1995 18.08 38.02%
1994 14.89 1.19%
1993 21.34 10.17%
1992 22.50 7.60%
1991 25.93 30.95%
1990 15.35 -3.42%
1989 15.13 32.00%
1988 11.82 16.64%
1987 14.03 5.69%
1986 18.01 19.06%
1985 14.28 32.24%
1984 10.36 5.96%
1983 11.52 23.13%
1982 11.48 21.22%
1981 7.73 -5.33%
1980 9.02 32.76%
1979 7.39 18.69%
1978 7.88 6.41%
1977 8.28 -7.78%
1976 10.41 24.20%
1975 11.83 38.46%
1974 8.30 -26.95%
1973 11.68 -15.03%
1972 18.08 19.15%
1971 18.00 14.54%
1970 18.12 3.60%
1969 15.76 -8.63%
1968 17.65 11.03%
1967 17.70 24.45%
1966 15.30 -10.36%

Average             18.77

The P/E ratio for the S&P 500 index has varied widely from the single digits to values of 40 or above. The important thing to observe is that very high P/E ratios are not always followed by low or negative returns, nor are very low P/E ratios followed by very high returns.  In terms of a baseline, the S&P 500 index returned approximately 9.5% over this 40-year period.  As is immediately evident, the returns of stocks are quite varied which is what one would expect given the fact that stocks are known as assets that exhibit volatility (meaning that they fluctuate a lot because the future is never known with certainty).  Thus, whenever a financial professional says that stocks are overvalued, undervalued, or fairly valued at any given point in time, that statement has very little significance.  Whenever only one data point is utilized to give a forecast about the future direction of stocks, an individual investor needs to be extremely skeptical of that statement.  The P/E ratio does hold a very important key for the future returns of stocks but only over long periods of time and certainly not over a short timeframe like a month, quarter, or even a year.

An improvement on the P/E ratio was developed by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, the Nobel Prize winner in Economics and current professor of Economics at Yale University. The P/E ratio that Dr. Shiller developed is referred to as the Shiller P/E ratio or the CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings) P/E ratio.  This P/E ratio takes the current value of a stock or stock index and divides it by the average earnings of a firm or index components for a period of 10 years and also takes into account the level of inflation over that period.  The general idea is that the long-term earnings of a firm or index determine its relative valuation.  Thus, it does a far better job of measuring whether or not the stock market is fairly valued or not at any given point in time.  However, another very important piece of the puzzle has to do with interest rates.  Investors are generally willing to pay more for stocks when interest rates are low than when interest rates are high.  Why?  If it is assumed that the future earnings stream of the company remains the same, an investor would be willing to take more risk and invest in stocks over the safety of bonds.  A quick example from everyday life is instructive.  Imagine that your friend wants to borrow $500 for one year.  How much interest will you charge your friend on the loan?  Let’s say you want to earn 5% more than what you could earn by simply buying US Treasury Bills for one year.  A one-year US Treasury Bill is risk free and, as of May 10, 2016 yields interest of 0.50%.  Therefore, you might charge your friend 5.5% on the loan.  Now back in the early 1980’s, one-year US Treasury Bills (and even savings accounts at banks) were 10% or higher.  If you were to have provided the loan to your friend then, you would not charge 5.5% because you could simply deposit the $500 in the bank.  You might charge your friend 15.5% on the loan assuming that the relative risk of your friend not paying you back is the same in both time periods.  It is very similar when it comes to investing in stocks.  Due to the fact that stocks are volatile and future profits are unknown, investors tend to prefer bonds over stocks as interest rates rise.  This phenomenon causes the value of stocks to fall.  Conversely, as interest rates fall, the preference for bonds decreases and investors will choose stocks more and prices go up.  Now this assumes that the future earnings of the company or index constituents stay the same in either scenario.

With that information in mind, a better way to gauge the relative valuation of stocks in terms of being overvalued, undervalued, or fairly valued, would be to look at the Shiller P/E ratio in combination with interest rates. It is most common for investors to utilize the 10-year US Treasury note as a proxy for interest rates.  Here are the historical values for the Shiller P/E ratio and the 10-year US Treasury note over the same 40-year period (1966-2015) as before:

Year CAPE Ratio 10-Year Yield
2015 24.21 2.27%
2014 26.49 2.17%
2013 24.86 3.04%
2012 21.90 1.78%
2011 21.21 1.89%
2010 22.98 3.30%
2009 20.53 3.85%
2008 15.17 2.25%
2007 24.02 4.04%
2006 27.21 4.71%
2005 26.47 4.39%
2004 26.59 4.24%
2003 27.66 4.27%
2002 22.90 3.83%
2001 30.28 5.07%
2000 36.98 5.12%
1999 43.77 6.45%
1998 40.57 4.65%
1997 32.86 5.75%
1996 28.33 6.43%
1995 24.76 5.58%
1994 20.22 7.84%
1993 21.41 5.83%
1992 20.32 6.70%
1991 19.77 6.71%
1990 15.61 8.08%
1989 17.05 7.93%
1988 15.09 9.14%
1987 13.90 8.83%
1986 14.92 7.23%
1985 11.72 9.00%
1984 10.00 11.55%
1983 9.89 11.82%
1982 8.76 10.36%
1981 7.39 13.98%
1980 9.26 12.43%
1979 8.85 10.33%
1978 9.26 9.15%
1977 9.24 7.78%
1976 11.44 6.81%
1975 11.19 7.76%
1974 8.92 7.40%
1973 13.53 6.90%
1972 18.71 6.41%
1971 17.26 5.89%
1970 16.46 6.50%
1969 17.09 7.88%
1968 21.19 6.16%
1967 21.51 5.70%
1966 20.43 4.64%

Average                19.80                          6.44%

These two data points provide a much better gauge of whether or not stocks are currently overvalued or undervalued. For example, take a look at the Shiller P/E ratio in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.  The value of the Shiller ratio is in the single digits during this time period because interest rates were higher than 10%.  Lately interest rates have been right around 2.0%-2.5% for the past several years.  Therefore, one would expect that the Shiller P/E ratio would be higher.  Now the historical average for the Shiller P/E ratio was 19.80 over this period.  The Shiller P/E ratio was in the neighborhood of 40 during 1998-2000 which preceded the bursting of the Internet Bubble in March 2000.  The Shiller P/E ratio was at its two lowest levels of 7 and 8 in 1981 and 1982, respectively which is when the great bull market began.  However, while this Shiller P/E and interest rates are better than simply the traditional P/E ratio, there are flaws.  The Shiller P/E in 2007 was 24.02 right (and interest rates were around 4.0% which is on the low side historically) before the huge market drop of the Great Recession between September 2008 and March 2009.  In fact, the S&P 500 index was down over 37% in 2008, and the Shiller P/E did not provide an imminent warning of any such severe downturn.  Therefore, even looking at these two measures is imperfect but better than the normal P/E ratio in isolation.

To summarize the discussion, individual investors will always be told on a daily basis by various sources that the stock market is currently overvalued, undervalued, and fairly valued at the same time. One of the most commonly used rationales is a reference to the current P/E ratio in relation to the historical P/E ratio.  As we have seen, this one data point is a very poor indicator of the future direction and relative value of stocks at any given period of time, especially for short periods of time (one year or less).  The commentary and opinions provided by financial “experts” to individual investors when the P/E ratio is mentioned normally relates to the short term.  By looking back at the historical data, it is clear that this one data point is really only relevant over very long periods of time.  The Shiller P/E ratio in combination with current interest rates is a great improvement over the traditional P/E ratio, but it is even imperfect when it comes to forecasting the future returns of the stock market.  There are two general rules for individual investors to take away from this discussion.  Whenever a comment is made about the current value of stocks and only one statistic is provided, the opinion should be taken with a “grain of salt” and weighed only as one piece of information in determining investment decisions that individual investors may or may not make.  Additionally, and equally as important, if a financial professional cites a statistic about stock valuation that you do not understand (even after doing some research of your own), you should always discard that opinion in most every case.  Individual investors should not make major investment decisions in terms of altering large portions of their investment portfolios of stocks, bonds, and other financial assets utilizing information that they do not understand.  It sounds like common sense, but, in the sometimes irrational world of investing, this occurrence is far more common than you imagine.